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THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
Since the last issue of the FORUM appeared the time for the regular meeting of
this society has been pretty well occupied
by lectures, as will be seen under another
head. When such lectures weregiven the
society held but short meetings to transact
the necessary business of the organization.
On the evening of Friday, Feb. 9, the society, however, held a regular meeting.
The question for debate on this occasion
was: "Resolved, That a uniform system
of examinations, for those who wish to
practice at the various bars of this State,
is desirable." This resolution was discussed affirmatively with much earnestness and vim by Messrs. John and Henderson. Messrs. Stauffer and Trude creditably upheld the negative. After this
disqussion Mr. Shellenberger entertained
the society by delivering a comic recitation of no small excellence.
WEORCAN CLUB.
The Weorcan Club still continues its
reading of Shakespeare's Hamlet, studying and criticising the work as it reads.
The members fully appreciate the profit
which they are gathering from the perusal
of this drama, and are determined to con-

tinue in the work until the end of the
school year.
Through the efforts of Mr. Hess and the
other members of the executive committee, several new features have been added
to the programmes. One of these is the
assignment of some subject which will
increase ones control of the English language to one of the members, and letting
him give a talk on that subject, thus serving the two-fold purpose of increasing the
knowledge of the club at the expense of
the time and labor of but one of its members, and giving that member training in
English composition and the delivery of a
talk. Another is the discussion of interesting subjects of the day, the merit of
which is very obvious. The third of these
is both novel and profitable. It consists
in the appointment of suitable persons to
note errors in particular lines and to call
the attention of-the club and the members
to such errors. This plan is one of the
best which the Cluh has thus far devised.
Gradually the executive committee will
add new departments to this system of
criticism until at least a majority-of errors
of language, whether in grammar, rhetoric, logic, pronunciation or elocution are
carefully noted and pointed out to those
who make them. It is difficult to see
what the far-reaching results of this system of criticism will be.
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DR. REED'S LECTURE.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.

On the evening of Friday, Jan. 26th,
Dr. Reed, at the request of the Allison Society, delivered the second lecture of his
series on "Some Phases of Public Speaking." Ie was greeted with a large and
enthusiastic audience. The "boys'" are
always glad to hear the President of the
Law School, since they can learn probably
as much from his eloquent style as they
can learn from the words which he speaks.
The lecture was opened by dividing
public speakers into four classes: First,
those who write out their discourse, and
afterwards read it from the rostrum; secondly, those who write out their discourse,
and then memorize it and deliver it from
memory; thirdly, those who think out
their discourse, arrange it logically in
their minds, and then speak from what
they have thus gathered and arranged;
and lastly, those who speak in a truly impromptu manner, not having made any
preparation whatever, whether in a general way or for the special occasion.
Dr. Reed strongly condemned this last
mode of speaking, since it leads but to
"words, words, words." On the other
hand, he very emphatically urged the
practice of that other kind of speaking,
commonly known as impromptu, namely,
that in which the material for the speech
is gathered beforehand, and the manner
of rendition only is left to the occasion. This method is very necessary to
the lawyer, since most of his legal work
will be just in this line.
For a set, formal speech, especially in
the forepart of a man's career, Dr. Reed
advised the first method, since it removes
any anxiety of the failing of the memory, invariably accompanying the second
method, and gives the advantage of a
carefully prepared discourse. The third
method was advised for those who can
master it, though they must needs be few.
The reading of the English Bible, the
English Dictionary and Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress were forcibly urged.
He closed with a masterly delivery of a
portion of Shields' speech in defense of the
Irish, delivered in the British Parliament.

Affairs in this society are very flourishing; The attendance has increased, and
the interest shown by the members in the
work and welfare of the society is encouraging. During the past month the
meetings have been helpful, and the programmes exceptionally interesting.
On January 26th a lecture was given in
the large lecture xoom on "Extemporaneous Speech," by Dr. Reed, before the combined societies. The lecturer gave an exceedingly interesting and able talk on the
various forms and the best methods of
public speaking, concluding with an eloquent recitation illustrating his'lecture.
At the next meeting of the society
Messrs. Piper, Bolte and Harpel were appointed by President Valentine, as a committee to confer with the Dickinson Society, and were empowered to renew the
suspended negotiations for an inter-society
debate, which event the members of the
Allison are unanimously in favor of. The
same evening both the societies listened to
an able and interesting lecture by the Hon.
XVm. Penn Lloyd, on the topic, "The
Banker and the Lawyer."
The program of February 9th was a particularly interesting and helpful one, the
debate being on the question of reform in
the present election laws. A declamation
by Mr. Wm. A. Warner was received with
much applause, and responded to with a
masterly rendering of "Sheridan's Ride. ",
A general debate on the case "Commonwealth vs. Bell" was participated in by
Messrs. Bolte, Coblentz, Valentine, Brock,
Heist, Rothermel, Harpel, Barr and Dr.
Stauffer, the speakers confining them
selves to the rulings on the various points
of law.
Mr. Silas Elder, Jr., has been received
into the membership of the society. Mr.
Piper, as chairman of the committee, reported that as yet no satisfactory arrangements have been concluded in the matter
of the inter-society debate, he being unable to induce the Dickinson Committee to
meet that of the Allison. We trust these
arrangements may be made in the near
future.

THV B4ORTM
LECTURE BY HON. WILLIAM PENN
LLOYD.
'The Lawyer and the Banker ' was the
subject of one of the most interesting and
entertaining lectures it has been the
pleasure of the Faculty and students of the Law School to hear. Prominent lawyers and bankers of- Carlisle
and surrounding towns also availed themselves of the opportunity to hear such
an able address by one who has had fifteen
years' experience as a banker in the
Dauphin Deposit Bank of Harrisburg,
and twenty years' actual practice in -the
profession of the law. It was delivered on
Friday evening, Feb. 2, by Ex-State Senator William Penn Lloyd, Esq., of Mechanicsburg, Pa., a prominent member of
the Cumberland County Bar and Treasurer
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association.
Mr. Lloyd is a man of wide and .varied
experience. His life has been one of unusual scope. In his early career he was
for a time a teacher in the public schools.
He served through the rebellion, going
out as a private in the ranks of a cavalry
regiment, and coming back as its adjutAnt.
He has been a Lieutenant Colonel of the
National Guards, United States Revenue
Collector.for the 15th Congressional District, and has written a history of his regiment.
In opening his address Mr. Lloyd said
that many people supposed the banker
and the lawyer to be a dangerous combination, the former having the opportunity
to cheat, and the latter knowing how to do
so, that both had their troubles, the banker
with the depositor, the lawyer with his
client.
He showed how the bank is a blessing
to the community in teaching the people.
First, that there is a right time to do a
thing; second, that expenditure should be
kept behind income, and that people who
do not meet their obligations are not respected by the banker or the community;
thirdly, that in business there shall be no
preference, whether on account of church,
politics, friendship or kinship; and, fourthly, that people be careful in their business
transactions.
He then gave a general review of banks
from the founding of the first bank down
to the present time, including the found-

ing of the Bank of North America by
Robert Morris, the chartering and rechartering of the Bank of the United
States, the refusal of a charter by the
Jackson administration, and the establishing of the national banking system in
1864, giving also statistics of banks, and
their resources at the present time, and information concerning the American Bankers' Association, and its under-associations.
He closed with a general defense of
banks and wealth, claiming that their
charities should rob them of their bad reputation. He claimed as much patriotism
for the wealthy as for their poorer brethren, showing how the Government was
saved by the patriotic efforts of Robert
Morris during the Revolution, of Stephen
Girard during the War of 1812, and of
banks in general during the Mexican,
Civil and Spanish-American wars.
One of the students of this School intends practicing in the West. He is in
receipt of a letter from a prominent business man of St. Louis. As showing the
esteem in which our School is held
throughout the country we quote from
his letter. In speaking of the Dickinson
School of Law he has this to say:
I I have talked with several attorneys
who stand at the head of the profession
here,

*

*

and it is recognized

here as a first-class School with a strong
Fac ulty.
*
*
*
Tf you have a
diploma from the Dickinson School of
Law, to be admitted to the bar here will be
a very easy matter."
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
Two more men from the Junior class
have been initiated during the past month,
William T. Osborne, of Jermyn, Pa., and
Hamilton D. Gillespie, of Philadelphia.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Garrett Stevens, '99, spent a few days in
Carlisle during January.
Hermann Sypherd, '99, has passed his
examination for admission to the Wilmington bar. He made a very high.
average. It is said that he intends to
practice in Atlantic City.

THE FORUM.
Stevens, '99, has presented to the Library a History of Common Law of England, by Matthew Hale, published in 1713.
J. F. Biddle, '97, is county solicitor to
the commissioners of Bedford county. He
is also a member of the bar committee.
Mr. Biddle has been taking an active part
in politics, and has recently made a number of speeches in support of Mr. Thropp,
nominee for Congress.
ATHLETICS.
The baseball squad has been having
light training for the past week or so. The
Law School contributes a number of candidates, prominent among whom are
Rothermel, McGuffie, Lauer, Boryer and
Adamson. It is the intention of the management to have a second team this year,
with its own schedule of games.
There has been a call issued for men from
the Law School to compete for places on
the track team. There are a number of
men of ability in various forms of track
athletics in the school, and it is to be hoped
that they will respond to the call.
Gen. Horatio C. King, of Brooklyn, has
kindly presented to the Library a set of
the Central Reporter and other valuable
books.

MOOT COURT.
JOHN PATTON vs. WILLIAM SCOTT.
Mitigation of damages.- Fraud-Mesne
profits.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.

Patton, thinking land had a valuable
ore in it, bought it for $2,000. If the ore
was there, it was in fact worth S25,000.
After buying it, he engaged Thomas Sergeant to make tests. Sergeant discovered
indications of large deposits, and colluded
with Scott to represent to Patton that no
ore was present, and thus induce Patton
to sell. Patton, influenced by Sergeant's
report, said he would sell, and Scott offered
to buy it for $1,000. Patton accepted, and
the conveyance was made. Patton went

to Europe, remaining there two years.
Meanwhile Scott had developed the ore
and taken out 20,000 tons of it, and sent it
to a distant market. He sold it for $50,000.
The expense of extracting it was $10,000,
and the cost of transporting it to the market where it was sold was $2,000. On Patton's return, learning of Sergeant's and
Scott's fraud, he brought this ejectment,
claiming mesne profits, after having tendered to Scott the $1,000, with interest.
Defendant asks the court to say, (1) the
possession cannot be recovered; (2) nor
mesne profits; but, if any, then only the
value of the ore, less the expense, i. e.,
$50,000 minus $12,000.
LAVENS and RILEY for the plaintiff.
1. One induced to enter into a contract by
fraud, may rescind the. contract and recover the property parted with. Cobb v.
Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 533; Burns v. Dockary,
156 Mass. 135.
2. The plaintiffcan recover mesle profits.
Ege v. Hill, 84 Pa. 333; Phillips v. Coast,
130 Pa. 572.
3. Defendant cannot set off his improvements in mitiga'ioh of damages. Wordhall v. Rosenithal, 61 N. Y. 393; Wood v.
Wood, 83 N. Y. 575.
LIGHTNER and JOHNSON for the defend-

ant.
1. A plaintiff in ejectment will not be
permitted to recover the mesne profits in
the same action, unless he gives previous
notice of said claim. Reiffv. Rapp, 2 W.
& S., 27.
2. Defendant used no fraudulent means
to acquire property, as he was not bound
to divulge its value to him. Harris v.
Tyson, 24 Pa. 358.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

I. There can be no doubt that the conveyance from plaintiff to defendant was
obtained by fraud. It appears that Sergeant and Scott deliberately entered into
a conspiracy by which Sergeant, who was
under a duty to tell the truth to plaintiff,
was to misrepresent the value of the land,
and Scott was to purchase it. The execution of such a conspiracy is obviously deceit, and a conveyance thereby obtained is
consequently voidable. It is equally clear
that where lands are held under a conveyance voidable by reason of having been
obtained by fraud, ejectment may be maintained for their recovery. Rankin v. Porter, 7 Watts 387; Am. & Eng. Encyc. of
Law, 2nd Ed., Vol. 10, p. 520.
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II. That mesne profits may be recovered
in ejectment was settled by Dawson v.
McGill, 4 Whart. 230, in which Chief Justice Gibson gave the mattervery careful
consideration. It is true, as defendant
contends, that evidence of mesne profits
should not be admitted unless notice is
given in time for preparation to encounter
it. Cook v. Nicholas, 2 W. & S. 27. But
surely it is sufficient notice when the claim
is made at the time of commencing the
action.
As to the amount of mesne profits recoverable in this case, discussion is precluded
by the decision in Foster v. Weaver, 118
Pa. 42. There a tenant in common of an
oil leasehold was fraudulently deprived of
his interest by his co-tenant. The land
was subsequently recovered by the plaintiff, and in an action for mesne profits it
appeared that the expenses of operation
exceeded the value of the oil pumped. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled
tc recover the value of his share of the oil
pumped, without regard to the expenses
incurred by the wrong-doer, Mr. Justice
Sterrett declaring that no other answer to
the question could be given, "unless it is
the policy of the law to make the way of
the transgressor easy and secure."
Judgment for plaintiff.

con, the brother of Joseph, began this ejectment.
O'KEEFE and Miss MAnvEL for the
plaintiff.
1. An estate by entireties arises whenever an estate vests in two persons, they
being, when it vests, husband and wife.
Bramberry's Appeal, 156 Pa. 628; French
v. Mehan, 56 Pa. 286; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39.
2. A married woman may divest herself
of her real estate only in the manner prescribed by statute. Stivers v. Tucker, 126
Pa. 74; Davison's Appeal, 95 Pa. 394; Inues
v. Templeton, 95 Pa. 262.
3. This action is not barred by the statute
of limitations. Updegrove v. Blum, 117
Pa. 259; Way v. Horton, 156 Pa. 22, and
cases cited.
PIPER and SLOAN for the defendant.
1. A parol gift of land by a father to his
son, accompanied with possession, and
followed by valuable improvements, is
valid, notwithstanding the statute of
frauds. Moorev. Small, 19 Pa. 461; Syler
and Wife v. Eckert, 1 Binney 377; Eckert
v. Eckert, 3 Penrose & Watts 332.
2. The eleven years' possession of Joseph
Bacon may be tacked on to that of John
Hitchcock, and this action is barred by
the statute of limitations. Cunningham
v. Patton, 6 Pa. 355.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

By the conveyance to Samuel Bacon
and Sarah, his wife, an estate in entirety
was vested in them.
"A tenancy by entireties arises whenSAMUEL BACON vs. JOHN HITCHever an estate vests in two persons, they
COCK.
being, when it so vests, husband and
Estates in entirety-Parolgifts-Statutes wife." Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 632.
That there has been no modification of
of limitations againstmarriedwomen
this common law rule, by recent legislaSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
tion, in reference to the rights and powers
John Bacon and his wife, Sarah, owned of married women is recognized in the
a farm, which had been conveyed to them opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered
by a deed containing the words, " hath by Justice Williams in 1895 in Young's
granted, bargained, sold, etc., unto John Estate, 166 Pa. 650. Holding the estate
Bacon and Sarah Bacon, their heirs and by entireties, upon the decease of John
Bacon, the husband, his wife, Sarah, as
assigns." On October 3, 1867, they orally
gave the farm to their son, Joseph, and survivor, took the whole estate. French
put him at once into possession, they re- v. Mehan, 56 Pa. 288; Bramberry's Estate,
tiring to another farm. Joseph retained supra.
But it is contended that a parol gift was
exclusive possession, and making improvements which increased the value of the made of the farm to the son of the owners
farm from $4,000 to $15,000. On February above named, and that valuable improve13, 1878, he conveyed it to Hiteheock for ments were subsequently put upon the
$15,500, who at once took, and since con- property, and that this precludes a retinued in possession. On June 8, 1889, covery by the plaintiffwho claims through
John Bacon died, and on June 8, 1897, them, or the survivor of them. That'a
Sarah died. On Sept. 1, 1897, Samuel Ba- valid parol gift of lands may be made by
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a father to his son, accompanied with possession, and followed by the making of
improvements by the son on the land, was
determined in Syler v. Eckert, 1 Binney
397, and this determination has been since
adhered to. Butin the present case it was
not in the power of John Bacon to dispose
of the whole or any part of the farm without the assent of his wife. French v. Meban, supra; MeCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa.
39. No such consent was given by the
wife to the giftto Joseph Bacon, which divested her title to the land.
"A married woman can only convey
real estate in the precise statutory mode
conferring the power." Innes v. Templeton, 95 Pa. 262; Stivers v. Tucker, 126 Pa.
74.
Nor would her acts and declarations
have estopped her, nor will they estop the
plaintiff claiming under her, from asserting title to the land. Davison's Appeal,
95 Pa. 394.
There is no statute of limitation which
bars a recovery, even if it had begun to run
on October 3, 1867, at the time of the gift
to Joseph Bacon. Thirty years had not
elapsed when the present action was instituted.
Besides, John Bacon did not die until
8th June, 1889, and it was only then that
his wife became seized of the.whole farm,
before which we are of the opinion that
the statute would not begin to run against
her.
The plaintiff therefore is entitled to recover the one-half of the farm which descended to him and his brother, Joseph,
under the intestate laws u~pon the death of
their mother, Sarah Bacon.
WM. HIPPLE vs. JACOB GORDON.
Administrator'ssale-Bent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Adam Hipple leased to Gordon his farm
for four years, beginning April 1st, 1894,
at the rent of $300 per year, payable at
the end of each year, and died April
27th, 1894, insolvent. Seven monthsafter
his death his widow, the administratrix,
obtained an order of the Orphans' Court
to se*ll the farm, in order to raise money to
pay the debts.
The sale was made in February, 1895, on

the terms that 331 per cent. of the purchase money be paid down; 331 per cent.
at the confirmation of the sale, and the remaining 331 per cent. one year thereafter,
when the deed should be delivered in conformity with the court's ord3r. The sale
was reported to the court, and by it confirmed on March lth, 1895. On the same
day the second 33), per cent. of the purchase money was paid.
On March l1th, 1896, the last 331 per
cent. was paid, and the administratrix delivered the deed.
The installments of rents, after the sale,
in February, 1895, were paid by Gordon to
the purchaser (William Soper).
This is assumpsit by William Hipple,
the only child of Adam Hipple, to recover
the 'same installments.
WALTER TAYLOR and KLINE for the
plaintiff.
1. The title is in the heir until confirmation, delivery of deed, and payment of
the entire purchase price. Biggert's E~t.,
20L Pa. 17; Lesher v. Gardner, 3 W. & S.
313; 69 Pa. 118; McReis' Appeal, 6 Phila.
75.
2. Rent falling due April 1, 1895, should
have been pid to the heir. Cobel v.
Cobel, 8 Barr 342; McDowell v. Addams,
45 Pa. 430; Hawk v. Stouch, 5 S. & R. 156.
MIURR and SHIREVE for the defendant.
1. A sale, even after confirmation, does
not divest absolutely the title of the heirs
for it remains in the power of the Orphans' Court until a deed has been executed and delivered. Lesher v. Gardner,
3 W. & S. 314; Johnson's Appeal, 18 W.
N. C. 202; DeHaun's Appeal, 156 Pa. 612.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff, as the only child and heir
of William Hipple, was entitled to the
rents and profits of the real estate of which
his deceased father died seized, until his
title to the same was divested by a sale
and a conveyance thereof to the grantee.
"The heir of the lessor is entitled to demand and receive the rents which may become payable after the decease of the
latter." Johnson v. Smith, 3 P. &. W.
500. The title of the owner is not divested
by mere confirmation of the sales. A deed
to the purchaser is necessary to effect this.
Lesher v. Gardner, 3 W. & S. 314, Emerick's Estate, 172 Pa. 195.
A decedent's heirs are entitled to the'
rents accruing from real estate of which
he dies seized, between the date of the con-
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firmation of an Orphans' Court sale, and
the date when the deed is delivered to the
purchaser, and the payment of such rents
to the purchaser is no defense to an action
by the heirs therefor. Strange v. Austin,
134 Pa. 96. But, while the plaintiff is entitled to the rent which had accrued and
was payable at the time of the delivery of
the deed on March 11th, 1896, yet he is
not entitled to any payable after that date.
That which became due on April 1st, 1896,
passed to the grantee. The rent which
was not due when the conveyance was
made was part of the realty, and passed
with it. It was an incident of the reversion, and the sale and transfer of title
carried it over to the purchaser. Bank v.
Wise, 3 Watte 405; Menough's Appeal, 5
W. & S. 432; Evans v. Hamrick, 61 Pa. 19.
The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover the rent payable April 1,1895, but is
not entitled to recover that payable April
1, 1896.
Judgment will, therefore, be entered in
favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant for $300, with interest from April
1,1895.
EVANS vs. SHIFFER.
Judgment lien.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

By the will of William Shiffer real estate alone is disposed of. While the testator vested a discretionary power in his
executor as to the sale of real estate for
seven years after his decease, it then became imperative upon him to dispose of
it.
It is clear that his intention was that it
was to be converted into money, and that,
as such, it was to be distributed to his son
and nephew. McClure's Appeal, 72 Pa.
414; Richard's Appeal, 100 Pa. 51; Mellob
v. Reed, 123 Pa. 1.
The judgments obtained by Evans and
Coles against Charles Shiffer did not become liens on the land of which the testator died seized. Allison v. Wilson, Ex.
13 S. & R. 330; Trickett on Liens, Vol. 1,
221, Vol. 3, 262.
The land of William Shiffer having by
the will been converted into personalty,
the share of Charles Shiffer was subject to

attachment in the hands of the executor.
Fenton v. Fisher, 106 Pa. 418.
Coles is, therefore, entitled to the amount
of his judgment from the proceeds of the
sale of lands which came into the hands
of the executor, while Evans has no lien
on the fund, and is not entitled to any
portion of the same.
By the court.
ELNORA GREEN vs. S. J. COOPER.
Interpretationof deed- Uncertainty
of grantees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This is an action in ejectment in which
the plaintiff seeks to recover an equal undivided one-fourth interest in the property
described in the following deed, viz.:
This indenture, made the Ist day of
November, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and fifty-nine, between John A. Talbot, of the towisship of
Smiley, county of Carlisle, and State of
Pennsylvania, of the first part, and Pamelia Talbot and Stephen A. Talbot's
heirs, of the town, county and State aforesaid, of the second part.

*

*

*

Witnesseth, that the said party of the
first part, for and in consideration of the
sum of two hundred dollars to me in hand
paid by the said party of the second part,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold, released and confirmed, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, release and
confirm unto the said party of the second
part, her and Stephen A. Talbot's heirs
and assigns, all that certain piece or parcel
of land, situate in the town, county and
State aforesaid, described as follows:
Beginning at a poplar tree below Truman Talbot's house, thence northeast forty-eight perches to a post and stones;
thence northwesterly forty perches to a
Eost and stones, the corner of Cynthia
eli's lot; thence southwesterly fortyeight perches to a post by the highway';
thence southeasterly to andl with the highway forty perches to the poplar tree, the
place of beginning; twelve acres, more or
less. *

*

*

*

*

*

Together with all and singular the hereditaffients and appurtenances thereto belonging, and the remainders and rents,
issues and profits thereof. *

_01

To have and to hold the premises, his
heirs and assigns, to the use of the said
party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, forever.

*

*

*

*

And the said John A. Talbot to the said
Pamelia and Stephen A. Talbot. his heirs,
the premises hereby granted, with the appurtenances, against all and every person
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or persons lawfully claiming or to claim
the same, or any part thereof, shall and
will warrant and forever defend the same.
In witness hereof the said parties have
hereunto interchangeably set our hands
and seals the day and year first above
written.
JOHN A. TALBOT [SEAL).
GARTRY TALBOT [SEAL].
Signed, sealed and delivered in presence
of us.
JOHN WALLACE.
R0OBERT FRANKLIN.
Received the day of the date of the above
written indenture of the above named
heirs the full consideration money above
med.
JOHN A. TALBOT.
Duly acknowledged and recorded.
At the time of the execution and delivery of the above deed Stephen A. Tal
bot and Pamelia Talbot were husband and
wife, living together as such, and had four
children, viz.: Elnora (plaintiff), Angeline, Mary and Anna. They, Stephen A.
and Pamelia, went'into possession of the
property, and lived upon it until the death
of Stephen A. Talbot, who died intestate
in 1892. In 1895 Pamelia Talbot conveyed
to her daughter, Anna, all her right, title
and interest in said property, and in 1896
Anna conveyed it to Cooper, defendant.
The four daughters are all-still living.
GERY and HESS for the plaintiff.
1. If original deed is Void fQr want of
certainty, then land belongs to Stephen
Talbot in fee by virtue of adverse possession. Porter's Appeal, 45 Pa. 207; Creswell's Appeal, 41 Pa. 288; Morris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 200.
2. This will not serve as color of title to
give land to Pamelia Talbot by survivorship of a tenancy in entirety, because ambiquity be one potent upon its face. Pittsburg R. R. Co. v. Renish 100 Ill. 157;
Hockins v. Kline, 4 Litt Ky. 318.
BASEHORE and FRANTZ for defendant.
1. The meaning giving validity will be
chosen if two meanings may be taken
from an instrument. Foster v. Rockwell,
104 Mass. 167; Brown v. Nuttocks, 103 Pa.
21.
2. A grantee is presumed to use a legal
term in a legal sense. Porter's Appeal,
45 Pa. 207; Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 18.
3. A tenancy in entirety arises whenever an estate vests in two persons, they
being when it so vests, husband and wife.
Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 632; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The legal effect of the deed from John A.
Talbot was to convey a fee in the land to

Pamelia Talbot. The conveyance is to
"Pamelia Talbotand Stephen A. Talbot's
heirs."
He "granted, bargained, sold and released and confirmed" the farm "unto the
party of the second part, her and Stephen
A. Talbot's heirs." Apt words tovest a
fee in Pamelia Talbot are used by the
grantor. Gray v. Parker, 4 W. & S. 17.
The grant to Stephen A. Talbot's heirs
was void for uncertainty, and they took
no interest in the land. Conclusive authority for the support of this position is
the case of Morris v. Stephens, 46 Pa. 200.
There is nothing in the deed to "Individuate the grantee," as was the case in
Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa. 282, and the
word "heirs" must be accepted in its
technical meaning. In no partof the deed
has the grantor designated or used a term
of phrase to indicate what particular heirs,
if any, were intended. "Stephen A. Tal.
bot's heirs" are, therefore, uncertain
persons, and in effect, no grant whatever
was made to them.
Stephen A. Talbot and his wife, therefore, went into possession of the property
as that of the latter, Pamelia Talbot. The
conveyance by her after the decease of her
husband to her daughter, Anna, vested a
fee in the latter, of which Cooper became
seized by the deed made to him in 1896 by
said Anna Talbot. Cooper is entitled to
recover the land described in the writ, and
judgment will be so entered.
JOHN KING vs. ADAM McKEE.
Assumpsit-Mistake-Fvidence,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A tract of land was conveyed to McKee
on Nov. 13, 1889. Previously the grantee
had conveyed away all the coal in it to
Thompson. There were two veins of coal,
one about forty feet above the other, the
upper surface of the upper one being about
twenty feet below the surface. Both veins
were, on the average, seven feet thick.
Thompson, who owned adjoining land,
operated the upper one from that tract.
Oct. 17, 1892, McKee agreed to convey-the
land to King, and a deed describing it by
metes and bounds was delivered. It contained no exception of the coal. In this
deed was a cavenant of general warranty.
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The price for the land was $175 per acre.
The coal in the upper vein was worth (estimated by witnesses) $75 per acre, and in
the lower, as much. The surface without
the coal would be worth $160 to $200, according to seven witnesses examined.
King subsequently attempted to take coal
from the upper vein, when an action of
trespass was brought by Thompson, and
he desisted. At a certain point on the
farm he was taking coal from the lower
vein, and no action was brought for this.
King discovering that Thompson owned
the coal, brought assumpsit on the covenant. Three witnesses for McKee swore
that it was understood at the purchase
that McKee had not the coal, and the
scrivener said he had been told to except
the coal in the deed, but had forgotten to
do so.
WALLACE and RlrAN for the plaintiff.
1. To change or alter a written instrument, the proof must be clear, precise and
indubitable. Quik v. VanAucken, 3 Pa.
69; Murray v. R. R. Co., 103 Pa. 37.
2. Deed to property, grantor having no
interest, will not be reformed. Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, Mistake, Vol. 15, p.
661.
3. Fraud, accident or mistake has not
been averred, hence evidence cannot be
admitted. Grubb's Appeal, 90 Pa. 228;
Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503.
4. Mistake must be mutual, and negligence may not be shown by grantor.
Brunseizer v. Davis, 134 Pa. 11; Wallace
v. Haas, 63 Pa. 24.
VALENTINE and LAUEn for the defendant.
1. Parol evidence is admissible to prove
that through the fraud or mistake of the
scrivener a clause was inserted in an instrument contrary to intention of parties.
Hamilton v. Asslin, 14 S. & R. 448; Gower
v. Sterner, 2 Whar. 74 (cases there cited) ;
Christ v. Diffenbok, 1 S. & R. 464; Chew
v. Gillespie, 56 Pa. 309. See also on question of parol evidence, Ins. Co. v. Webster,
59 Pa. 227; Hoffman v. R. R., 151 Pa. 174;
Osborne v. Walley, 8 Sup. Ct. 193-97; Rearick v. Rearick, 15 Pa. 66; Morrison v.
Morrison, 6 W. & S. 516; Turner's Appeal,
59 Pa. 398.
2. The testimony being clear, precise
and indubitable, sufficiently established
the oral understanding to warrant the submission of the question to the jury. Ferguson v. Rafferty, 128 Pa. 337; Axle Co.
v. Leyda, 188 Pa. 322; Thomas v. Loose,
114 Pa. 35; Smith v. Henry, 4 Sup. Ct.
377; Spencer v. Colt., 89 Pa. 314; Pyrolum v. Hider Co., 169 Pa. 440 ; Gould v.
Lee, 55 Pa. 108.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action is assumpsit on the covenant
of general warranty contained in the deed
from defendant to plaintiff. The plaintiff
having proved that the defendant did not
own the coal in the land conveyed at the
time of the conveyance, the defendant
asserts that he did not intend to convey
the coal to plaintiff; that it was mutually
understood at the time of the sale that the
coal was to be excepted from the deed, and
that a clause to that effect was omitted
from the deed by a mistake of the scrivener. In support of his assertion the defendant offers the testimony set out in the
statement of the case, and the court is now
called upon to determine whether or not
such testimony should be permitted to go
to the jury.
The rule is firmly established that parol
evidence is admissible for the purpose of
proving mutual mistake in the terms of a
written instrument, and the cases are
numerous in which the rule has been invoked to correct the error of a scrivener.
Hamilton v. Asslin, 14 S. & R. 448; Chew
v. Gillespie, 56 Pa. 309; Gower v. Sterner,
2 Whart. 74. The plaintiff does not deny
the existence or applicability of this rule,
but contends that unless the evidence of
mutual mistake adduced by the defendant
be found by the court to be clear, precise
and indubitable, the court should refuse
to submit it to the jury. If such were
really the law, there would never be an
occasion to submitthe question to the jury,
for in case the evidence of mutual mistake
be found by the court to be clear, precise
and indubitable, it would be the duty of
the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The true rule, it is apprehended, is,
that if the evidence of mutual mistake be
such that the jury would be justified in
regarding it as clear, precise and indubitable, it should be submitted to their consideration; butalways with the instruction
that unless the evidence seems to them to
be clear, precise and indubitable, they
must refuse to reform the instrument. In
other words, if the. evidence be such that
reasonable men might differ as to whether
or not it is clear, precise and indubitable,
the question is within the domain of the
jury. Spencer v. Colt, 89 Pa. 314; Young
v. Edwards, 72 Pa. 257; Cullmans v. Lind-
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say, 114 Pa. 166; Stafford v. Giles, 135 Pa.
411; Axle Co. v. Leyda, 188 Pa. 322;
Thomas v. Loose, 114 Pa. 35.
It is not the duty of the court, then, to
determine whether the evidence in the
case at bar is clear, precise and indubitable, but whether it is of such a character
that the jury might be justified in so finding. That it is, cannot seriously be
doubted. Three witnesses swear positively
that it was understood at the purchase
that defendant did not-own the coal; the
scrivener swears that he had been told to
except the coal, but had forgotten to do so;
and in addition to this testimony, it appears that whereas the price paid by plaintiff to defendant for the land was $175 per
acre, the coal alone was worth $150 per,
acre, and the land without the coal $160
to $200 per acre. This evidence of value
has in itself but little bearing upon the
question of mutual mistake, and it might
be urged that itis not of a character proper
for the jury to consider in the determination of that question. But in the case of
Stafford v. Giles (supra), which, like the
case at bar, arose from the sale of coal
lands, testimony as to value was pointed
out in the charge to the jury as evidence
of mutual mistake, and the charge was
upheld upon appeal.
The evidence will be submitted to the
jury with the instructions indicated by the
foregoing opinion.
HARRY RHOADS vs. WILLIAM

TEMPLETON,

ET AL.

Assumpsit--Indemnity-Guaranee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Holmes, owning a lot, was having
erected on it a building. No mechanics'
liens had been filed, but they might still
be filed, when Holmes borrowed $3,000
from Rhoads, giving a mortgage upon the
lot as security. Two months later, three
liens, amounting to $2,400, were filed
against the lot, which, improved, was
hardly worth more than $4,000. Rhoads
complained of the impairment of his security, and insisted on some additional security. Holmes then got his friend
Templeton to unite with him as surety on
a paper reading thus :

CARLISLE, PA., June 19th, 1897.
We hereby indemnify Harry Rhoads
against any loss he may sustain as mortgagee, on account of mechanics' liens that
have been, or may be hereafter entered
against the mortgaged premises.
Witness our hand.
JOHN HOLMES.
j
Wm. TEMPLETON.

I

Subsequently a lien for$250 was entered.
This isassumpsit on the indemnity.
ALEXANDER and M ooN for the plaintiff.
1. There is a well settled difference between an agreement to pay a certain sum
and an agreement to indemnify. In first
case actual damage must be shown. In
tW-e latter recovery may be had as soon as
liability occurs. Fisher v. Hoppoek, 73
W. S. 99; Howe v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275.
2. Seal imports consideration as of
courqe. Schwartz v. Shreur, 62 Pa. 457;
Hosler v. Hursch, 181 Pa. 422.
BOLTE and DETRTOK for defendant.
1. Whether an instrument is under seal
or not is a question for the court, but
whether at time or not of delivery is for
Jury. Duncan v. Duncan, Watts 322;
Hoker's Appeal, 121 Pa. 192; Miller v.
Bender, 28 Pa. 489; Long v. Ramsey, I S.
&R. 71.
2. A promise to stand liable for debts of
another is of no force unless founded upon
consideration. Hess' Estate, 150 Pa. 346;
Romberger v. Golden, 99 Pa. 34.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

When the $3,000 was loaned by Rhodes
to Holmes, and the mortgage taken to secure the payment of the same on the house
of the latter, it was in the course of erection. Liabilities had been incurred which
might be entered as mechanics' liens
against the property. After some such
liens had been entered, the defendant
joined the owner of the premises in a
writing, guaranteeing the plaintiff, the
mortgagee, against loss by reason of the
entry of the same, or of any that might be
thereafter entered.
No money was parted with by the
plaintiff, or credit given to Holmes on account of the said guaranty. The plaintiff
hazarded nothing on the faith of it, his
risk had already been taken. He had
loaned his money and taken as security a
mortgage upon the house and lot, which
were liable to be charged with liens for the
labor and materials furnished for the construction of the said house.
But it is urged on part of the plaintiff
that the instrument is under seal, and that
a consideration is imported, even if there
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Was no consideration in fact to support it.
Is the instrument under seal? This is a
question of law, and must be determined
by the court. Duncan v. Duncan, 1 Watts
324; Appeal of William Hacker, 121 Pa.
192.
The paper by its terms does not purport
to be under seal. It is first signed byJohn
Holmes, and then by the defendant.
Above the name of the former there is a
scroll, but there is nothing to show that
this was ever adopted by Templeton as his
seal. No intrinsic evidence appears on the
face of the obligation, as was the case in
Bowman v. Robb, 6 Pa. 302. We cannot
hold that Templeton sealed the guaranty.
In Taylor v. Glaser, 2 S. & R. 302, the

College to have the right at any time to
buy the building at cost. The house was
erected, and a certain material man, not
having been paid, a lien was filed against
it. In order to pay the material man, the
Chapter trustees desired to borrow $1,800,
and the College agreed that they might
borrow that sum, on the security of the
building. Thereupon the Chapter trustees
borrowed $1,800 from Henry Adams, giving him a judgment note. On the judgment entered thereon an execution was
issued, and the interest of the Chapter
trustees in the building and curtilage
levied on and sold by the sheriff to Adams.
Adams took possession and turned the
house into a residence for a tenant. Therewriting concluded with the words, "In
upon the College tendered the cost of the
testimony whereof we have hereunto set building, $2,500, to Adams, and insisted
our hands and seals," and on which there that he should surrender the possession.
were two subscribing witnesses under the Adams refusing, this ejectment was
words "sealed and delivered in presence brought.
of." Yet the court held that a flourish
MEARKLE and COBLENTZ for the plainunder the name of the obligor could not tiff.
1. Adams, the purchaser at sheriff's
be treated as a seal.
sale, acquired only what interest the fraAnd in Austin's Admx. v. Whitlock's
ternity had. Smith v. Painter, 5 S. & R.
Exrs., reported in 1 Muiumford 487, it was 223; Water
Power Co. v. Wilson, 83 Pa.
decided that a written instrument which 83; Sill v. Swackhammer, 103 Pa. 7; Aderconcluded with the words, "Witness my
hold et al. v. Oil Well Supply 6o., 158
hand," was not a specialty, although there Pa. 401; Miller v. Baker, 166 Pa. 414.
2. Ejeetment is the proper action to dewas a written scroll annexed to the signa- termine
the possession and title to real
ture.
property. Wills v. Fox, 1 Dallas 308;
We are, therefore, of the opinion that
Bergman v. Roberts, 61 Pa. 497; Tilghman
under the law, as settled by the courts v. Marsh, 67 Pa. 507; Reeser v. Johnson,
Pa. 313; Long'sAppeal, 92 Pa. 171; Mothere can be no recovery by the plaintiff 76
han v. Butler, 112 Pa. 590.
as the guaranty was without consideraDOUGHERTY and STAUFFER for the detion.
fendant.
1. A purchaser at judicial sale, without
PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE vs.
notice at time of sale of priorencumbrance,
HENRY ADAMS.
will be protected as bonafide purchaser.
Stewart v. Freeman, 22 Pa. 120; Goepper
Ejectment-Sheriff's sale-Notice.
v. Gartner, 35 Pa. 130; Jackson v. Post, 15
Wend. 588. A judicial creditor who purchases at sale under his own judgment
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
comes under same rule. Mann's Appeal,
The Pennsylvania College at Gettysburg 1 Pa. 24; Boynton v. Winslow, 37 Pa. 315.
2. Ejectment will not lie on a license or
has a campus of sixty acres. TheChapter
of a Greek letter fraternity, desiring to an incorporeal hereditament.
3. A defendant in ejectment is not aferect a Chapter house, obtained leave to fected
by an equity without notice thereof.
put it on the campus from the College Rafferty's Estate, 9 Phila. 336; Hoff's
Trustees. The agreement was made be- Appeal, 84 Pa. 42.

tween them and five persons acting as
representatives and trustees of the Chapter
(which is unincorporated), that the latter
might erect the house, the College having
general supervision of it. No mechanic's
or other liens to be put upon it, and the

OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is not necessary to discuss the nature
or extent of the interest of the fraternity
trustees under the agreement with the
college. The sheriff did not pretend to
gell an estate or a license or an easement,
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ternity trustees, and the college, having
but merely the "interest of the trustees,"
whatever that may have been. The only made valid tender of the cost of the buildquestion, therefore, is whetherthe defend- ing, is entitled to possession of the premises.
Ejectment is unquestionably the proper
ant, by his purchase at the sheriff's sale,
secured the property free from the condi- remedy. If defendant merely claimed a
privilege or easement, ejectment might not
tions contained in the agreement between
be suitable-Clement v. Youngman,40 Pa.
the college and the fraternity trustees. It
341; Carnahan v. Brown, 60 Pa. 23; but we
of
doctrine
the
that
established
is well
caveat emptor applies to sheriff's sales. understand him to raise the question of
Smith v. Painter, 5 S. & R. 223; Friedly title, to determine which ejectment is the
v. Scheetz, 9 S. & R. 156; Moffat v. Israel, approved form of action.
Judgment for plaintiff.
4 Yeates 489; Weidler v. Farmers' Bank,
11 S.& R. 134; Banks v. Ammon, 27 Pa.
172; Aderhold v. Oil Well Supply Co., 158
BLAKE'S ESTATE.
Pa. 401. This does not mean that the
purchaser takes subject to all defects. "He
Alterationsin written instrument-Burden
is not bound to see what is not to be seen.
of proof.
He is protected by the recording acts
and secret defects in a title apparently
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
good are for him no defects at all." Thus,
an auditor making distribution of
Before
if in the case at bar the record had shown
a conveyance to the fraternity trustees, Blake's estate, William Hood presented a
the defendant would have taken the prop- check, reading thus:
CARLISLE, October 7, 1898.
erty subject to the conditions therein conCARLISLE DEPOSIT BANK,
tained, and free from all other conditions
Pay to Amos Friend, or bearer, the sum
of which he had no notice. But there was of twelve hundred and seventy-three dolfailpurchaser,
The
no such conveyance.
lars.
JOHN BLAKE.
$1273.00.
ing to find upon the record any conveyOn the back of the check was Friend's enance whatever to the fraternity trustees,
was certainly placed upon inquiry as to dorsement. The word twelve was written
the nature and extent of their interest and over a scraped place, except the letters t
the conditions upon which they held the and w. The ink used in writing twelve
property. If he had made inquiry he was the same in color and appearance as
would have found that one of the condi- that used on the rest, and the same pen
tions was that the premises should be sur- seemed to have been used. The letters e
rendered to the college at any time, upon 1 v e were more crowded together than the
payment or tender of the cost of the build- letters t and w in twelve, and than the
ing erected thereon. Having failed to letters in the other words. The figure 1
make inquiry, he purchased subject to all seemed to be in the same ink and with the
rights which inquiry would have disclosed. same pen as the other figures 273.00.
Other creditors objected to the reception
As was said by Mr. Justice Williams, in
Aderhold v. Oil Well Supply Co., 158 Pa. of the check in evidence until explanation
401, where the appellant was the purchaser was tendered of its present appearance.
of an oil lease at sheriff's sale: "As such The signature was not disputed, nor any
purchaser he could acquire no greater in- other part of the check, which (except
terest or estate than that actually held by signature) had been written by Friend.
RUSSELL and BARR for the plaintiff.
the lessee, and he would take subject to all
1. The check should have been admitted,
the covenants and conditions in the lease.
He was bound, therefore, to inquire. :Fail- for .thedefendants, alleging it to be altered,
proved no alteration. Simpson v.
ing to do so, he is fixed with notice of all have
Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Farmers' L. & T. Co.
that inquiry would have disclosed." The v. Liefke, 44 N. Y. 354; Willet v. Shepdefendant, then, being chargeable -with herd, 34 Mich. 106.
notice of the extent and nature of the inSHAFFER and SAULSBURY for the deterest of the fraternity trustees, and of the fendant.
1. A person offering an altered check
rights of the college under the agreement,
can claim no greater interest than the fra- must explain its alteration before it will be

THE
received in evidence. Nagle's Estate, 134
Pa. 34; Nesbitt v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429;
Hartley & Co. v. Carboy,. 150 Pa. 23.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Amos Friend supports his claim against
Blake's estate by producing a check for
$1273. That the name John Blake was
actually written by Blake is not disputed,
nor that the rest of the 6heck was written
by Friend, the payee. When A subscribes
a note, check, bond, etc., written by B, he
adopts such note, check or bond according
to its import, making it his own.
The question before us is, was the check,
as it is now, the check to which Blake
affixed his name? There is no evidence
upon the point, other than that furnished
by the check itself. It is clear that the
check does not present very convincing
evidence that it was in another form when
Blake executed it. Of the word twelve,
the letters e 1 v e are written over a scraped
place. Why was the scraping? Was it
on the paper before the check was written? Was there an accidental blot, which
it was designed to remove? Had some
other letters than those intended been first
written, and were they deleted in order
that the proper ones should be written?
Or, were the letters originally written,
written with intention, and did the parties
afterwards change their intention as to the
amount, and, in execution of the changed
intention, scrape off what had'been written and write the letters now appearing?
All these suppositions would consist with
the identity of the present check with the
check to which Blake subscribed his name.
It is clear, then, that the hypothesis that
the scraping took place after Blake's execution of the check is only one of at least
five that would account for the present
appearance of the word "twelve."
Nor is any aid given to the fifth hypothesis by the color of the ink, or the general
nature of the characters. The letters e I v e
seem to be in the same ink, by the same
pen and by the same hand as the rest of
the check. The letters e I v e are, however, more crowded together, but this circumstance simply suggests that some
shorter word has been erased, and in its
place twelve inserted. Were this so, it
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would be inconsistent with the first two
hypotheses, but equally consistent with
any of the other three.
The Arabic numerals on the left hand of
the check are equivalent to the words, and
there is nothing in them suggestive that
any of them has been changed or inserted.
since the completion of the instrument.
The check cannot be said, then, to satisfactorily show that it was altered after execution by Blake. But, does it raise a
reasonable suspicion that it was so altered?
We think it does. The erasure is where a
critically important part of the check, its
amount, appears. Illegitimate changes
in the amounts are more frequently made
than in otherportions of such instruments.
The letters t w may have been parts of the
word two. The space occupied by e 1 v e
is no larger than the letter o and the space
between it and the word hundred may
have occupied. That space enough was
left between the dollar mark and the
figures 273 to admit the insertion of the
figure 1 is quite supposable. A substantial suspicion, we think, that twelve has
been substituted for two, is justifiable.
But, are any consequences to flow from
this suspiciousness? We think that when
the face of a document is thus suspicious,
he who pretends to use it to establish a
right, must allay the suspicion. The burden is upon him to explain those features
which have awakened it. Simpson v.
Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186; Gettysburg Nat.
Bank v. Chisholm, 169 Pa. 564; Hartley v.
Carboy, 150 Pa. 23; Citizens' Nat. Bank v.
Williams, 174 Pa. 66; Nesbit v. Turner,
155 Pa. 429; Nagle's Estate, 134 Pa. 31.
The maker of the cheek is dead, and it
would be improper to cast on his administrator or next of kin the burden of showing that the check has been changed since
it left Blake's hands. The features of the
check that arouse our suspicion should
have suggested to Friend that they would
need explanation ; and he was negligent
in accepting the check in its present form,
if it was in fact in that form when he
took it.
The auditor was right in refusing to receive the check without explanation, and
Friend's exception to his report is dismissed.
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PHILLIPS' ESTATE.
Legacies chargedupon land--Set-off.
STATE

ENT OF THE CASE.

Adam Phillips, dying October 3, 1897,
devised a farm to his grandson (son of a
deceased son) Jacob, and provided that "'he
pay to my heirs the sum of $2,700." The
testator left to survive him, besides Jacob,
a son, Charles; a daughter, Sarah Roberts,
and a grandson, John; son of another (deceased) daughter, Rebecca Williams. Rebecca Williams had borrowed and not repaid $900 from her father on August 12th,
1890. Sarah Roberts was also indebted to
him for a house sold to her in the sum of
$1,750, since 1894. On October 17th, 193,
Sarah Roberts died, leaving to survive her
a son Amos. This is a petition to the
Orphans' Court by Charles, John Williams
and Amos Roberts, for a decree that Jacob
Phillips pay each $900; or, in default, that
the land devised to him be sold.
The petition alleging the above factsdemurrer by Jacob Phillips.
RALSTON and ROTHEnmEL for the plain-

tiff.
I. The devisee cannot make set-offs for.
(a) The debts he seeks to set-off are payable to the administration only. Milliken
v. Grader, 37 Pa. 456; Gerber v. Meredith,
160 Pa. 102. (b) There is no mutual right
to sue between the parties. Lee v. Perry,
6 Kulp 339; Trunick v. Giprick, 81 Pa. 160.
EDWARDS and BOp.YER for the defendant.

settled by numerous adjudications. Field's
Appeal, 36 Pa. 11; Littleton's Appeal, 93
Pa. 181; Hartzell's Estate, 178 Pa. 289. An
executor cannot enforce the payment of
legacies charged on land. The payment,
however, is resisted by the respondent, because of the indebtedness of the two
mothers of the petitioning grandsons to
the estate of their father, Adam Phillips.
He insists that he should be allowed to
set-off the proportion of this indebtedness
to which he would be entitled to as one of
the heirs or distributees of the same against
the legscies payable to the petitioners.
But the indebtedness is not in the same
right, nor is there such mutuality as will
enable the devisee to set-off indebtedness
due by the legatees to the estate of the devisor, nor any proportion of the same.
Gerber v. Meredith, 160 Pa. 102.
It will be the duty of the executor to
collect the assets of the estate, and have a
distribution made of the same. In no
other way can John Phillips, the respondent, be placed in a position to enforce
payment of the claim he iow seeks to setoff against the legacies charged on his
land.
The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to
have the decree made which has been
prayed for.
HARTMAN vs. BOROUGH OF
MIDDLETOWN.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

License-Permitsfrom borough
authorities.

Adam Phillips devised a farm to his
grandson, John Phillips, provided he paid
to the heirs of him, the said Adam, the
sum of $2,700.
This became a charge on the land in the
hands of the devisee. Pryer v. Mark, 126
Pa. 529. The heirs of the testator, besides
this devisee, were a son Charles, and two
other grandsons, the children of the deceased daughters, both of whom were indebted to their said father. These heirs
under' the provisions of the 59th section of
the Act of 24th of February, 1834, applied
to the Orphans' Court for an order and decree directing that the legacies so charged
on the land should be paid to them .by the
devisee thereof. -That such payment can
be enforced only by the legatees has been

M. H. Hartman is the owner of a house
and lot of ground situated at the corner of
Lawrence street and Witherspoon avenue,
in Middletown, and as such, applied to the
Middletown Drainage Company for sewage facilities, but was refused them at their
regular schedule of rates; whereupon, he
requested the burgess and town council,
of the borough of Middletown, to devise
some means by which he would have
proper drainage for his property. The
said borough of Middletown, on the 14th
day of October, A. D. 1895, passed a resolution authorizing Hartman to enter upon
And lay a drain beneath the surface of a
portion of Witherspoon avenue, for the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
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purpose of catrying off surface water from

OPINION OF THE COURT.

his premises. Hartman thereupon, at
great trouble, inconvenience and expense,
laid terra-cotta pipe through his lot and
over a portion of Witherspoon avenue,
which pipe was allowed to remain unmolested for a period of over two years.
Some time in the latter part of January,
A. D. 1898, the defendant, without first
having obtained permission from plaintiff,
tore up the terra-cotta pipe on said portion
of Witherspoon avenue, and plugged the
remaining portion of said pipe at a point
along the line of Hartman's lot, adjacent
to the cellar wall of the property of Adam
Baumbach.
This caused the surface
water to accumulate in the portion of the
terra-cotta pipe remaining on his lot, and
flow back into his hydrant, Mlooding the
same, as well as the portion of the lot adjoining the kitchen of his property.
The water which accumulated in the
pipe remaining on Hartman's lot was
caused to flow into the cellar of the property owned by Adam Baumbach, causing
damage to it, which damage the plaintiff
was compelled to pay, and in order to remove the cause of damage to the property
of the said Adam Baumbach, he, at great
trouble and expense, removed the terracotta pipe from his lot. This necessitated
the changing of spouts on his property and
the water course at hydrants, which the
said plaintiff did at considerable trouble
and expense.
Wherefore plaintiff says ne has sustained damage in the sum of four hundred
($400) dollars, and, thereupon, he brings
suit.
MEYER and STEWART for the plaintiff.
1. The right is in the nature of an easement. Dark v Johnston, 55 Pa. 164; De
Hare v. U. S., 5 Wall 599.
2. The borough is liable for a negligent
disregard of the right granted. Child v.
Boston, 4 Allen 41; Barton v. Syracuse. 37
Barb. 292; Campbell v. AlcCoy, 31 Pa. 236;
Thompson v. MeElarney, 82 Pa. 175.
AUBREY and HEIsT for the defendant.
1. The right is a mere license. Tiedeman on Real Prop., Sect. 1, 623; Morse
v. Copeland, 2 Gray 302.
2. This right the borough may at any
time revoke. Johnson v. Crow, S87 Pa.
187; Bransdonv. City of Philadelphia, 47
Pa. 32.9; Monongahela Nay. Co. v. Coons,
6 W.&S. 101.

The solution of the question presented
by this case depends on the power of the
borough to make a contract or license,
for the laying of a drain in a street, which
should preclude the recall of the right to
maintain it.
Within certain limits, aborough may so
far authorize a private drain, that the excavation in the street for the purpose of
laying it shall not be a public nuisance, of
which the licensee may be deemed guilty,
as respects third persons. Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32; Wood v. McGrath, 150
Pa. 451, or on account of the abuse of
which the borough will be liable.
Borough of Susquehanna Depot v. Simmins, 112 Pa. 384.
Our attention has been called to no case,
however, in which it has been held that
the borough itself is so far bound by the
license to or contract with an individual
for the erection by the latter of a private
sewer, that it cannot revoke such license
or put an end to such contract, whenever,
in its opinion, a sound municipal policy so
requires. In Hutchinson v. Board of
Health, of Trenton, 39 N. J. Eq. 569, the
power of the city to authorize the construction of a private drain in the public
streets, was denied, and such a use of the
drain as constituted a nuisance, was restrained as a nuisance. The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, in Eddy v.
Granger, 28 L. R. A. 517, declared that a
town could not give a vested right to maintain'a private drain in a highway such
that a subsequent cutting off of the drain
by an extension of the system of sewers,
would create any liability against the
town. A different view was held by certain members of the Michigan Supreme
Court, in Stevens v. City of Muskegan, 36
L. R. A. 777, but even there it was held
that an action at law for damages for the
prevention by ordinance of the use of
a private sewer in a public street, would
not lie, although the ordinance interfered
with the vested contract rights of the
plaintiff.
The reason for the act of the council of
Middletown does not appear. The council
has general control of the streets, the
sewers, etc. The right of Hartman to
originally build th6 drain, is predicated by

THE VORUM.
him upon its concession. We do not
think that council may alienate their control over the streets and the sewerage
system of the borough so far as to preclude
thei retraction of the right to maintain
the drain. If this be true, Hartman knew
when he built the drain, that his right was
precarious, and at the will of the licensor.
He cannot complain, however indignant
and disappointed he now feels, at the deprivation, in view of whose possibility at
any time, he built the drain.
W.Te do notsee how, in any event, the defendant is to be charged with the damage
to Baumbach, which Hartman paid.
When his drain was plugged up it was
Hartman's duty to adopt means to prevent
the flooding of Baumbach's cellar. He
was not excused from this, because of the
act, even if tortious, Of the borough
which made it necessary. Indeed, his
paying Baumbach, if voluntary, is an admission of this duty. If it was compelled
by the judgment of a court, that judgment
must have assumed the existence of such
a duty.
The legitimate cost of the change of the
water-spouts, and of "the water-course at
the hydrants," could doubtless be recovered, were there any right of action at
all. This we have been constrained to
negative.
Plaintiff non-suited.
SAUINDERS vs. GOULD.
Liability of commercial agency for negligence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Gould having for years collected information about the financial standing of persons in business in the Cumberland Valley, at length published that he would
furnish a printed list of such persons, with
their standing, to subscribers paying
twenty-five dollars ($25) per year.
.. Saunders, a Philadelphia merchant, received an order from a Carlisle merchant,
Adams, subscribed for the list, paying the
twenty-five dollars ($25), and finding that
Adams was rated, as having assets equal
to fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), and
debts equal to five thousand dollars
$5,000), sold him five hundred dollars'

($500) worth of goods. The copy furnished
by Gould to the printer had said Adams
was worth fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500)
and owed a debt of five hundred dollars
($500). Adams, in fact, when the list was
printed, had thirty-five hundred dollars
($3,500) of assets, and was indebted to forty-seven hundred dollars ($4,700), ajudgment against him for three thousand dollars ($3,000) being in the court of Common
Pleas. Saunders' sale took place five (5)
weeks after the publication of the list, but
no material change in Adams' situation
had since taken place. Shortly after the
sale, that is, three (3) days, another creditor entered ajudgment for fifteen hundred
dollars ($1,500), issued execution and levied
on all hig property, which was subsequently sold.
Saunders, unable to obtain payment of
any part of the five hundred dollars ($500),
sues Gould in trespass.
TRUDE and HOLcoMB for the plaintiff.
1. The defendant's negligence was the
cause of plaintiff's loss, and in the absence
of stipulations against liability for negligence the plaintiff must recover. Carew
v. Bradstreet, 134 Pa. 161 ; Sprague v.
Dun, 12 Phila. 310; Duncan v. Dun, 7 W.
N. C. 497.
ADAMSON and LENrz for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In furnishing printed lists containing
information as to the financial standing of
business men in the Cumberland Valley
the defendant unquestionably engaged
that such lists had been prepared and
printed with a reasonable degree of care and
skill, and that a raasonable degree of diligence had been employed in collecting the
information therein contained. Sprague
v. Dun, l2Phila. Rep. 310; Carew v. Bradstreet, 134 Pa. 161. Indeed, the rule is
general that when a person offers his services to the public in any business, trade
or profession, there is an implied engagement with those who employ him that he
possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience which is ordinarily possessed by persons in the same
business, trade or profession, and which is
ordinarily regarded by the community,
and by those conversant with that employment, as necessary and sufficient to
qualify him to engage in such business,
trade or profession, and that he will per-
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form matters intrusted to him diligently
and faithfully. Hale on Torts, p. 474, and
cases there cited.
It is undoubtedly true that the defendant might have expressly contracted
against liability for negligence, although
such contracts are not looked upon with
favor by the law, and are therefore construed strictly, with every intendment
against the party seeking their protection.
Carew v. Bradstreet, 134 Pa. 161; Duncan
v. Dun, 7 W. N. 0. 246. In the record of
the case, however, no such. contract appears, and Gould's only defense is that he
is not chargeable with failure to exercise
due care under the circumstances. The
copy furnished by him to the printer stated
that Adams was worth $1,500 and owed a
debt of $500, thus showing an excess of
$1,000 in assets over and above liabilities.
As a matter of fact, Adams' liabilities exceeded his assets by $1,200. This serious
discrepancy is not explained, and in view
of the fact that the major part of Adams'
liabilities consisted of a judgment in the
court of Common Pleas, it is difficult to
resist the conclusion that Gould is chargeable with negligence in collecting his information. Moreover, in printing the lists
another blunder was committed, which
was even more serious than the first. By
a typographical error, which the defendant failed to detect, Adams' assets were
stated as $15,000 and his liabilities as
$5,000, thus showing a balance of $10,000,
instead of $1,000. In failing to discover
and correct this mistake, the defendant
is undoubtedly chargeable with negligence.
In Carew v. Bradstreet (mpra) the defendant's book represented a certain corporation as having$600,000 capital actually
paid in, whereas in fact that was the
amount of authorized capital, of which
only $20,000 had been paid in. The error
was shown to have been merely typographical, but the court said: "It
was
certainly neglect on the part of the company to issue a book containing such.a
gross error." The error in the case at bar
is perhaps not so great as that in the case
quoted, but we think it sufficiently-grave,
under the circumstances, to charge the
defendant with negligence as matter of
law.
Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

HARRISON vs BLACK.
Conditionalsale-Bailment.
STATEMENT OF TnE CASE.

This indenture, made on the fourth day
May, A. D. 1898, between Samuel Harrison, of the first part, and Morris G. Black,
of the second part, Witnesseth, that
Samuel Harrison doth let unto the party of
the second part, a new hay wagon for the
term of three months, from this day, and
the sum of $135, for which a note of even
date has been given, for which, in consideration of the delivery to me as bailee of
said Samuel Harrison, agrees to pay a
rental for the use and hire thereof, and in
case of default of payment of above rent,
Samuel Harrison is authorized to enter and
remove said wagon, and collect said rent,
and when said note is fully paid the said
Samuel Harrisoa will deliver to the party
of the second part a bill of sale for said
wagon.
Witness my hand and seal.
MORRIS G. BLACK, [SEAL].
At the same time that the above agreement was entered into ajudgment noze for
$135, absolute on its face, was given by the
said Black to Harrison, payable in three
months. The wagon was delivered to
Black at the same time. On August 4th,
1898, Black paid $12 to Harrison. On
September 16th, 1898, without any fault
of either party, the wagon was destroyed
by fire. Harrison took possession of the
iron-work, with the consent of Black, and
made an unsuccessful effort to collect the
insurance for the wagon, representing that
it was his property when destroyed. On
December 22nd, 1899, Harrison entered
judgment on his note. Upon rule to show
cause, judgment was opened and an issue
directed.
This action is to determine what
amount, if anything, is due Harrison.
LIGHTNER and CLARK for the plaintiff.
1. The transaction was a conditional
sale. Ott v. Swartman, 166 Pa. 217, and
cases there cited; Edwards' Appeal, 105
Pa. 103.
2. Under this contract the vendor may
either retake the property or sue for its
price. Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa.
150.
3. The attempt to collect the insurance
does not amount to a rescission of the con-
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tract, for the vendor in a conditional sale
of insured personalty hasa right to recover
the insurance. Reed v. Luckens, 44 Pa.
200; Parcell v. Grosser, 109 Pa. 620.
4. Loss of property without fault of the
vendee does not relieve him from liability
to pay for it. 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc., 2nd
Ed., 455; Hannston v. Cherry, 23 Hun.
141.
JOHNSTON and LAVENS for defendant.
1. The title, under this contract, remaining in Harrison at the time of the loss, he
cannot recover. Wells v. Alnan, 107 Mass.
514; Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 290; McIahon v. Rauhr, 47 N. Y. 65.

cution creditors or purchasers of the
wagon from Black, contesting the validity
as to them of the transaction, nor is it easy
to conceive how they could object to Harrison's compelling Black to pay the money
according to his promise.
The first objection to a recovery, is that
the wagon has been destroyed by fire.
But why should the loss be Harrison's?
He had parted with the possession of it.
H e had lost the right to recover the possession, except on Black's default. The
"title," which he retained, was simply a
OPINION OF THE COURT.
means of compelling the payment of the
The contract between Harrison and price in order to avoid a rescission of the
Black purports to be a loan of a hay wagon contract. Black had become at least as
from the former to the latter. Harrison substantial an owner of the wagon as Har"lets" it for the "term of three months"
rison. He had the possession, the power
and the sum of $135. Black, who signs to retain it forever, and the power to exand seals the contract, in consideration of tinguish whatever simulacrum of ownerthe delivery to him, as "bailee," agrees to ship might remain in Harrison. His repay a "rental" for the "use and hire" of lation to the latter, with respect to the
the wagon. In case of default of the pay- wagon, was in all importantrespects, simiment of the "above rent" he authorizes lar to the relation of a vendee of land
Harrison to "remove said wagon and col- under articles to the vendor. If between
lect said rent." When "said note" is the contract of sale and the conveyance a
fully paid Harrison is to deliver a bill of diminution of the value of the land ocsale of the wagon.
curs by means of a fire or other agency,
Itis evident that the $135 is the "rental"
the vendor does not lose the right to reintended, and that it is the sum which cover the price. The loss falls on the
Harrison is authorized to collect. If the vendee, who is the equitable owner. Parwords of the parties are to be taken liter- cell v. Grosser, 109 Pa. 617; Reed v.
ally, the note is a security for the rent, Luckens, 44 Pa. 200; Demmy's Appeal, 43
which has been fully earned, and no de- Pa. 155. We see no reason for imposing
fence has been suggested, which would the loss resulting from the burning of the
prevent a recovery upon it. The defend- wagon upon Harrison.
ant contends, however, and the plaintiff
It is suggested by the defendant that
concedes, that the transaction, though Harrison demanded the insurance money
termed a lease, or bailment, was, in fact, a after the fire, asserting that it was his
contract to sell on the payment of the note, property that was destroyed. He could
the possession intermediately passing Lo not have claimed the money, except as
Black, with the reservation to Harrison of owner. He had in the contract styled
the "title" and of the right to resume himself bailor. We have seen that he
possession, on Black's default. We are of was not bailor. The defendant concedes
the same opinion. Let us then see, on this that he was not bailor. The defendant reassumption, what there is to prevent the pudiates the hypothesis on which the deplaintiff's recovery.
mand on the policy was made. As the deThe sale was oi a credit of three months. mand was unsuccessful it cannot be alThe $136 was the price of the hay wagon. leged to estop Harrison from now proIt was not seriously intended to be com- ceeding on the assumption whose truth the
pensation for a three month's use of the defendant concedes. But, even if Harrivehicle. This price was to be paid uncon- son had obtained the insurance money, he
would have held it as trustee for Black,
ditionally, and the note in suit was given
for it. The parties to this action are the who could defalk it from thenote. Reed
parties.to the contract. There are no exe- -. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200; Parcell v. Grosser,
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109 Pa. 617. It was not only his right, but
his duty towards Black to endeavor to collect the policy, and it would be strange if
this endeavor to perform his duty towards
Black should deprive him of his remedy
upon the note.
Another objection alleged to the recovery
is that after the fire Harrison took possession of the ironwork. In the absence
of an express stipulation that the vendor
may both resume possession of the chattel
contracted to be sold, and sue for the price,
he has the option to adopt either measure
of redress, but not both. He can retake
possession. Levan v. Wilton, 135 Pa. 64,
North v. Williams, 120 Pa. 109; 6 Am. &
Eng. Encyc., 479, 480; but if he does so,
he cannot sue on the note or other security
for the price. His resumption of possession is understood to be a rescission of the
contract. Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa.
150; Campbell v. Hickock, 140 Pa. 290;
Scott v. Hough, 151 Pa. 630. The defendant alleges that the taking possession of
the "ironwork" was expressive of Harrison's purpose to rescind, and so precludes
him from subsequently sueing for the
price.
We do not think that the taking
possession of the ironwork has this
The
for two reasons.
significance,
parties may bestow on each other as
many remedies as they choose. The right
to sue for the price may be one; the right
to regain possession of the chattel, and retain it until the price is paid, may be another. The defendant expressly stipulated that "in case of default of payment
of above rent, Samuel Harrison is authorized to enter and remove said wagon and
collect said rent." The "rent" here mentioned is, as we have seen, $135, the price
of the wagon. Harrison, therefore, had
the right to retake the whole wagon as security for the money, and to sue for the
money. The parties competent to do so,
have so contracted. Their will is the law.
And if Harrison could take the whole
wagon, without losing the right to sue, he
surely could take the remnants of the
wagon.
But the taking of the ironwork was apparently not in the assertion of a right, for
it was "with the consent of Black." The
entire significance of the act depends on

its having been done with reference to the
right of rescission. If it was not an act
of rescission it can not impair the right to
sue for the price of the wagon. That it
was not intended to be a rescissionis probable from the folly of taking back the iron
work of a wagon as a substitute for the
remedy on the note for $135. Had he
taken back the whole wagon, in substantially its original condition, it might readily
have been supposed that he intended to
divest the conditional interest in it of
Black, and surrender his right to the
price. Such intention cannot be imputed
because of the taking possession of the
comparatively worthless remains of the
wagon.
We think it follows that the plaintiff
should recover the$135, with interest from
three months after its date, less $12, with
interest from August 4th, 1898, and
(further, if the jury is of opinion that the
understanding was that the value of thc
ironwork should be deemed a partial payment on the debt) less the value of the
ironwork, with interest from the time of
the plaintiff's taking it.
JOHN BELL vs. AARON MOSIER.
Conditionalsale--Payment bypromissoryj
note.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mosier, a jeweler, agreed that Bell
should have a gold watch on paying $15
down and $5 monthly till its price, $100,
should be paid; the watch to remain Mosier's till the whole was paid. After paying three monthly installments, Bell paid
no more. Six months after ceasing to pay
Bell stopped in Mosier's store to have a
friendly talk, when the latterasking to look
at the watch and see if it needed cleaning,
obtained it from Bell; he refused to give it
back unless Bell should give him a note
for the unpaid balance, with surety. Bell
obtained his father as surety, and Mosier
accepted the note and gave back the watch.
When the note fell due it was not paid.
Two days thereafter Bell took the watch
to Mosier to be repaired, and Mosier kept
it. Nor did he hand back the note. Replevin for watch.
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SHELLENBERGER

and DAvis for the

plaintiff.

I. When buyer gives a note for the price
it is primafacie absolute payment of the
note. Plankinham v. Cave, 2 Yeates 370;
Tacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299; Dodge
v. Emerson, 131 Mass. 468.
GRAuL and ROBiTAiLLE for the defendant.
1. A promissory note does not discharge
a debt, but merely postpones such discharge. Segrist v.'Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287.
2. After failure to pay the note the vendor's right to take the property was complete. Anson on Contracts, 273; Hayes v.
McClurg, 4 Watts 452.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The watch was not to become the property of Bell until the price, $100, was fully
paid. Possession was, however, given to
Bell. It must be understood that the
right to the retention of it was conditioned
upon BelPs making the payments according to his stipulation. Bell having paid
$40, paid no more for six months, when
stopping at Mosier's store to have a friendly
talk, he let Mosier have the watch on his
pretense that he would examine to see if it
needed cleaning. Gaining the watch in
this way, Mosier refused to give it back to
Bell, unless Bell should give him a note,
with surety, for the balance of purchase
money. When the note was given the
watch was restored to Mosier.
Mosier had a right to repossess himself
of the watch, even by a trick or deceptive
pretense, and to retain it either in rescission
of the contract, or, at all events, as a means
of coercing performance of it. What are
we to regard the intention of the parties
in giving and receiving the note? If such
act was a payment, the watch became the
unconditional property of Bell. Was it a
payment ?
When a debtor gives a note or check to
a creditor for an existing debt, the note or
check is to be regarded as payment only if
and when it is paid, the right of suit on the
original debt being meantime suspended.
Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233; League v.
Waring, 85 Pa. 244; Shepherd v. Busch,
154 Pa. 149; Levan v. Wilber, 135 Pa. 61.
Nothing in the evidence before us indicates a different purpose of the parties.
When, then, the note was not paid, at maturity, all rights on the original contract
revived, and among them was the right of

Mosier to treat the watch as his own, and
to regain the possession. Levan v. Wilber, 135 Pa. 61.
After the note had become due, the
watch was taken by Bell to Mosier to be
repaired. Mosier, thus peaceably getting
it, refused to give it back. In so acting
he did what he had a right to do. Whether
he could rescind the contract, without repaying to Bell the $40 or not, he surely
could retake the watch, and keep it until
payment for it was completed.
The action of replevin presupposes a
present right in the plaintiff to the possession. Possibly Bell could, by completing the payment, require the redelivery.of
the watch to him. Before doing so, however, he has no such right. The court,
therefore, properly instructed thejury that
the plaintiff could not recover.
New trial refused.
JONES vs. SIMPSON.
_enewal ofjudgment-ights ofjudgment
debtor's grantee--Notice of sci. fa. to
terre-tenant- Unrecordeddeed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jones obtained a judgment against Josiah Hooper for $250 -on Aug. 11, 1894,
Hooper then owning for lifea farm. Three
months afterwards he acquired the remainder in fee. On January 19, 1899,
Hooper conveyed the farm to Simpson, but
the deed was not put on record. On Aug.
20, 1899, a sci. fa. to revive the judgment
was issued against Hooper, naming nobody as terre-tenant, but the sheriff served
the writ on Simpson, and returned service
on him as terre-tenant. A judgment of
revival was recovered against Hooper and
Simpson, as terre tenant. The land was
sold by the sheriff on this judgment, and
bought by Jones, who brings this ejectment to recover the possession.
HENDERSON and JOSEPH RHODES for

the plaintiff.
1. The terre-tenant'sfailure to record his
deed prevents the lien from being lost.
Wetmore v. Wetmore, 155 Pa. 507; Buck's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 109.
2. The defendant cannot question the
validity of the sale, for he was properly
served with notice, and failed to except lo
the sale within the proper time. Hinds
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v. Scott, 11 Pa. 19; Kichner v. Dengler, 1 fortiori, such failure of the terre-tenant
Watts 424; Colborn v. Trinysey, 13 Pa. 38. would not excuse a failure to take any
KATZ and ELMEs for the defendant.
steps whatever to revive the judgment.
1. Five years having elapsed from the
The decision in Armstrong's Appeal
time of the judgment, its lien has ceased
worked
an undoubted hardship to credto exist as regards purchasers. 1 P. & L.
Dig. 2471; 1 Tricketton Liens, 246; Rudy's itors, and as a result the Act of April 16,
Appeal, 9 W. N. 0. 308; McCahan v. El- 1849, was enacted,providingthat the period
liott, 103 Pa. 634; Green's Appeal, 6 W. & of five years during which the lien of the
S. 327.
original judgment continues shall only
OPINION OF THE COURT.

commence to run in favor of the terre

The principal contention of the defend- tenant from the time when he placed his
ant is that since the plaintiff failed to have deed on record. This act was construed in
a scire facias issued on.the judgment Porter v. Hitchcock, 98 Pa. 625, where the
against Hooper within five years from the learned court says: "The Act of 1849 so far
date of its entry, the said judgment, at the alters this rule that a revival of the judgexpiration of that period, ceased to be a ment against the original debtors will bind
lien upon the land purchased by him. The the terre-tenant, unless he has put his
precise question before us, therefore, is deed on record, or is in the actual possesthis: Will a failure to institute the statu- sion of the land, and his right to notice
tory proceeding to revive a judgment
now commences only from the date of such
within five years from the date of its entry record, or time of such possession. In
result in the loss of the creditor's lien as other words, by complying with the terms
against a terre-tenant who purchased be- of this act, he entitles himself to the notice
fore the expiration of the five years, but prescribed by the Act of 1827, otherwise he
whose deed is not recorded, and who does is entitled to no such notice, and his land
not appear to have taken possession of the continues to be bound by the lien of the
original judgment so long as it is kept repremises?
The question is not only an interesting vived against the original debtor." It
and important one, but one which, we be- will be noticed that even in the interprelieve, has not been directly passed upon tation of this act-favorable as it is to the
by the courts. Its decision, of course, creditor-the necessity of instituting promust be controlled by the -provisions of ceedings against the original debtor withthe Act of June 1, 1887; but in the inter- in five years, although his conveyance to
pretation of that law a brief review of the the terre-tenant is unrecorded, is absoearlier legislation may be of some value. lutely unquestioned.
The original Act of April 4, 1798, was of a
Turning now to the Act of June 1, 1887,
very general and indefinite nature, and we-find that it re-enacts the Act of 1827,
was greatly abused in practice. Its effi- including the provision that no judgnent
ciency was much increased, however, by shall continue a lien upon the real estate
the Act of March 26, 1827, and, as thereby
of a terre-tenant "for a longer period than
supplemented, it enacted in effect that no five years from the day on which such
judgment should continue to be a lien upon judgment may be entered or revived, unreal estate during a longer period than five less revived within that period." This is
years, unless revived within that period so plainly inconsistent with the Act of
by agreement of the parties and terre-ten- 1849 that the Superior Court has felt comants filed in writing, or a writ of scire fa- pelled to decide that the Act of 1849
cias to revive the same be issued within is thereby repealed. Uhler v. Moses,
such period. In interpreting the provi- 10 Pa. Sup. Ct. 194. The hardship to
sions of this statute, it was expressly de- creditors under the Act of 1827, which the
clared that in case the defendant convey Act of 1849 was designed to remove, howland before the expiration of five years, ever, is not re-imposed by the Act of 1887,
the fact that the terre-tenant fails to record for in the interpretation of the provisions
his deed does not excuse a failure to make of that act it has been held that failure to
him a party to the revival proceedings.
make party to the proceedings a terre-tenArmstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 352. A ant, whose deed is unrecorded, and who is
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not in possession, will not result in the
oss of the lien as against such terre-tenant. Lyon v. Cleveland, 170 Pa. 611;
Meinwiser v. Hains, 110 Pa. 468 In these
cases, as in the cases arising under both of
the earlier statutes, it appears to be conceded that the fact that the terre-tenant's
conveyance is not on record, and even that
he is unknown to the creditor, will not
excuse a failure to institute the statutory
proceedings. In the case of Lyon v. Cleveland (supra), the court characterizes an
attempt to revive, upon the discovery of
the existence of a terre-tenant, after the
expiration of five years from entry of the
judgment, as "wholly unauthorized," and
further says: "Under such circumstances
the revival of the judgment (before expiration of five years) against the defendant
is all that is possible to the creditor, and it
will continue the right to seize and sell the
real estate."
A careful study of the course of legislation which has been outlined, and of the
many cases in which the several acts have
been discussed and construed, convinces
us that the purpose of the present statute,
as well as of those which preceded it, is to
make it necessary for the protection of the
creditor, that he revive the judgmeat every
five years, even though he believes and is
justified in believing that the property
still remains in the hands of his debtor.
To hold otherwise, it is believed, would be
to place a limitation upon the effect of the
act which is not justified by its language,
and which, moreover, is not supported by
any equitable consideration. In case a
debtor, after the lapse of five years from
the entry of an unrevived judgment, conveys land to another, the purchaser certainly takes such land free from the lien
of the judgment, and a subsequent revival
by the creditor would have not the slightest effect, even though the purchaser's
deed be unrecorded. This, for the reason
that at the time of the conveyance the
land is free and clear from the lien of the
judgment, except as against the judgment
debtor himself. Why should a different
conclusion be reached, when the conveyance is made before the lapse of five years ?
Of course, the purchaser holds subject to
the lien of the judgment until the expiration of the fifth year, but from that day,

the judgment not having been revived according to statute, the land is freed from
its lien, except as regards the judgment
debtor himself, and he, of course, has no
remaining interest in the land whatever.
The argument may be advanced that by
the purchaser's failure to record his deed
the judgment creditor is lulled into a sense
of security; is led to the belief that the
land is still owned by the debtor, and concludes that proceedings for revival are not.
necessary in order to save his lien. The
obvious answer is, that such a conclusion
on the part of the creditor is entirely unwarranted. He should know that even
though the land still appears to be owned
by his debtor, a failure to revive before the
lapse of five years will expose his lien to
the danger of being defeated at any moment by the conveyance of the premises.
His only safeguard is the timely revival
of his judgment. If he avails himself of
that safeguard, his lien is preserved as
against all subsequent liens or proprietary
interests, even though he is not aware of
their existence. If he neglects it, his lien
is lost as against such subsequent liens or
proprietary interests, whether or not their
existence is known to him. To put it in
another way, the only difference between
the rights of a terre-tenant whose deed is
recorded and one whose deed is unrecorded
is, that whereas the former is entitled to
notice of the proceedings to revive a judgment, the latter is not. In both cases the
proceeding itself is absolutely indispensable if the lien is to be saved.
Since, in the case at bar, the lien of the
judgment was lost by the failure to revive
within the statutory period, the defendant's title must be upheld. It is therefore
unnecessary to consider any question as to
the regularity of.the subsequent proceedings.
Judgment for defendant.
BOROUGH OF RUSH vs. MOSER.
Place of assessment of seated landswhen
tract is divided by township line-Act
of July 11th, 184e.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

And now, January Ist, 1900, it is hereby
agreed by and between the parties of the
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above stated action that the following case
be stated for the opinion of the court in
the nature of a special verdict:
H. C. Moser, the defendant above named,
is the owner, of a farm containing one
hundred acres, lying partly in the Township of Ralpho, where the farm buildings
are situated, and partly in the Borough of
Rush. The authorities of the Borough of
Rush assessed defendant upon the ten
acres of his farm lying within the borough
limits, while the authorities of Ralpho
township assessed him upon the property
lying within the limits of said township.
If the court be of the opinion that the
ten acres of land lying in the Borough of
Rush is assessable there, and not in the
Township of Ralpho, where the farm
buildings are situate, judgment should be
entered for plaintiff, otherwise for defendant;
FRA-K and BROCK for the plaintiff.
1. The land should be taxed by the borough. Arthur v. School District, 164 Pa.
410; LaPlume Borough v. Gardner, 148
Pa. 192; Trickett on Borough Law, Vol. 2,
page 86.
2. Statute of July l1th, 1842, does not
govern this case, for it must be construed
strictly, and by such construction it applies only to townships. Dully v. Philadelphia, 6 Wright 197.
BA.RR and HEIST for the defendant.
1. The borough cannot assess the land,
for the mansion house of the whole tract
is situated in the township, and the tract
as a whole must be there assessed. Act of
July llth, 1842; P. L. 32 Sec. 59; Bausman
v. County of Lancaster, 50 Pa. 211.
NOTE-The Act of June 1st, 1883, ii unconstitutional.
LaPlume Borough v.
Gardner, 148 Pa. 192.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The argument of this cause has revealed
what appears to be an oversight on the
part of the Supreme Court of this state.
By the Act of July 11, 1842. it was enacted
that assessments of seated lands shall be
made in the township in which the
mansion house is situated, when township
lines divide a tract of land, and in the case
of Bausman v. County of Lancaster, 50
Pa. 208, it was held that this Act, being
remedial, should be liberally construed and
that it applies to cases where a tract of
land is divided by a line between a township and a borough or a city. "Landsare
not the less divided by a township line,"

said Strong, J., "because that line may
also be the line of an adjoining borough or
city, and the evils resulting from assessment in parsels by different assessors,
rather than assessment in entirety, are the
same where part is situate in a township
and part in an adjoining borough or city,
as where the parts are separated only by a
line between two townships." The court
also referred to the Act of April 25th, 1850,
which enacted that the Act of 1842 should
not be construed to extend to lands lying
in different townships, the mansion house
of which is in an incorporated borough or
city, and pointed out the clear implication
that the Act of 1842 does extend to lands
divided by a line between a township and
a borough or city when the mansion house
is not in the borough or city.
Such appears to have been the state of
the law when the Act of June 1,1883, was
passed. That Act was entitled, "An act
to require assessors of townships to assess
all seated lands in the county in which the
mansion house is situated, where county
lines divided a tract of land," and provided that "the assessors of the several
counties within this Commonwealth shall
on seated lands make the assessment in
the county in which the mansion house is
situate when the county lines divide a
tract of land, and when the lines which
separate a borough from township, or one
borough from another, pass through the
lands of any person such lands shall be assessed where the mansion house is situated." Subsequent to this enactment the
case of LaPlume v. Gardner, 148 Pa. 192,
arose, in which it appeared that defendant
owned a farm lying partly in one township, where the mansion house was situated, partly in another township, and
partly in the Borough of LaPlume. The
borough council assessed defendant upon
the portion of his property lying within
the borough limits, while the authorities
of the township in which the mansion
house was situate, assessed him not only
upon the portion lying within the limits
of that township, but also upon the portion situate within the Borough of LaPlume. The court decided the case in
favor of the Borough of LaPlume, declaring that the Act of 1883 was unconstitutional so far as concerned township and
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borough lines for the reason that there
was nothing in the title of the Act to give
notice that lands divided by township and
borough lines were affected by it. See
Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article

2, 3.
That the Act of 1883 was properly declared unconstitutional cannot be questioned. But the conclusion of the court
that because of the unconstitutionality of
the Act of 1883, the land in the borough
was not assessable in the township where
the mansion house was situate, would
seem to be erroneous. The Act of 1842
does not appear to have been repealed, and
as construed in Bausman v. Lancaster
(aupra) it precisely covers the case of LaPlume v. Gardner. The only possible explanation.of the decision in the latter case
is that the Act of 1842 and the case of
Bausman v. Lancaster were overlooked by
the court. That such was the case, is, perhaps, evidenced by the still later decision
of Arthur v. School District, 164 Pa. 410,

where Mr. Justice Williams makes the
statement that "No power to levy and
collect taxes on property outside the lines
that bound the district was ever asserted
until the Act of June 1, 1883."
This
decision, like that of LaPlume v.
Gardner was based upon the invalidity of
the Act of 1883, but it is not open to the
objection urged against the soundness of
LaPlume v. Gardner, since the mansion
house was situated in the city, and the
case was, therefore, one which by the Act
of 1850 was excepted from the operation
of the Act of 1842.
We are of the opinion that the Supreme
Court would, if opportunity afforded, overrule the case of LaPlume v. Gardner, as
contrary to the provision of the Act of
1842, and we, therefore, hold that in the
case at bar the ten acres in the Borough
of Rush were not assessable by the borough
authorities.
Judgment for defendant.

